I Introduction
Are labour markets competitive or are they characterised by frictions that essentially render them imperfectly competitive? This question can be addressed by estimating the elasticity of labour supply to a firm, as suggested by the dynamic monopsony framework. The essence of monopsonistically competitive or oligopsonistic labour markets is that labour supply to a firm is imperfectly elastic with respect to the wage rate. The intuition is that, where workers have heterogeneous preferences or face mobility costs, firms can offer lower wages without immediately losing their workforce. This is in contrast to the perfectly competitive extreme, in which the elasticity is infinite. Monopsony theory suggests that the lower the ability of a worker to exploit outside options and move from job to job, the further will that worker's wage be below his or her marginal product, and the greater the share of rents that the employer can appropriate from the worker. In short, labour market frictions may generate a surplus that can be appropriated by wage-setting employers. To address this question, our article estimates the elasticity of the labour supply to a firm. We do this using data from the first seven waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, a panel survey that started in 2001.
There are a number of reasons why labour markets might be frictional or imperfectly competitive. Two important examples include heterogenous preferences for non-wage characteristics of jobs (Bhaskar & To, 1999; Hamilton et al., 2000) or search frictions (Albrecht & Axell, 1984; Burdett & Mortensen, 1998; Manning, 2003) . According to Bhaskar and To (1999) , workers have idiosyncratic preferences over employment at different firms, and these preferences are private information. Thus, a firm's wage offer depends on how much he or she believes the employee prefers working there, rather than elsewhere. To support this argument, Bhaskar and To (1999) cite various empirical studies. They then show that equilibrium implies a firm offers a wage below marginal product, where the firm's trade-off is between offering an even lower wage and an increased probability that the worker chooses to work elsewhere (see also Boal & Ransom, 1997; Bhaskar et al., 2002) . The dynamic monopsony models produce related predictions. It is these predictions that we investigate in the remainder of the article.
To foreshadow our main results, we find that the Australian wage elasticity of labour supply to a firm is around 0.71. This is only slightly smaller than the figure of 0.75 reported for the United Kingdom. In contrast, the elasticity of labour supply for the United States is found by Manning (2003) to be 1.38 using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data and 0.68 using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data. All these estimates are so far from the perfectly competitive assumption of an infinite elasticity that it would be difficult to make a case that labour markets are perfectly competitive.
The next section of the article outlines the model and methodology, whereas Section III describes the data. Section IV presents estimates of the separation elasticity and Section V gives the implied elasticity of labour supply to a firm. A comparison is also made between our estimates and those obtained by Manning (2003) using comparable data for the United States and the United Kingdom. As the HILDA Survey used in our analysis is very similar in structure to the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and to the US PSID, this comparison is particularly relevant. As a sensitivity analysis, Section VI presents fixed effects estimates based on the conditional logit model. Section VII discusses gender differences in the wage elasticity of separations and compares the Australian estimates with those found in the United States and the United Kingdom. The final section concludes.
II Methodology
In deriving empirical predictions from a dynamic monopsony model based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , we closely follow Manning (2003, chapter 4) . Denote separation and recruitment rates, respectively, by:
Here, s(w) is the separation rate from a firm that pays wage w, d is the exogenous rate at which workers leave employment for non-employment and k is the arrival rate of job offers from the distribution of wage offers F(w). The flow of recruits to the firm is denoted by R(w), whereas R u represents recruits from non-employment, and N(w) is the firm's employment level. In steady state, the total number of separations is equal to the number of recruits. Our estimates of the elasticity of labour supply are calculated using the two different methods described next.
(i) Method 1
Differentiation with respect to w of each of the pair of equations before, and use of the steady-state condition that s w ð ÞN w ð Þ ¼ R w ð Þ; yields the following:
which states that the separation elasticity e sw equals the negative of the recruitment elasticity e Rw . Rearrangement of the steady-state condition yields N(w) = R(w) ⁄ s(w). After taking logs of this, simplifying and using Equation (2), one obtains the following expression for the elasticity of labour supply e Nw :
Thus, estimating the separation elasticity and doubling it will provide an estimate of the elasticity of labour supply. 1
(ii) Method 2
We now relax the assumption that separations to and recruitment from non-employment are not sensitive to the wage and calculate the elasticity of labour supply as a weighted average:
where e e sw and e n sw are the separation rates to employment and non-employment, e e Rw and e n Rw are the recruitment rates from employment and non-employment, h S is the share of separations to another job and h R is the share of recruits from employment. To simplify, we assume:
Thus, Equation (4) becomes:
We will present estimates of the elasticity of labour supply calculated using both these methods.
III Data Our data are from Waves 1 to 7 of the HILDA Survey. The HILDA Survey distinguishes between employment-related and personal reasons why a respondent stopped work in the last job, with detailed reasons given in each category. It is therefore possible to differentiate between transitions that are job-to-job and those that are job to non-employment. 2 The HILDA Survey is a nationally representative random sample panel survey of private households in Australia. All members of households providing at least one interview in Wave 1 formed the basis of the panel followed in each subsequent wave. The sample has been gradually extended to include new household members resulting from changes in the composition of the original households. The HILDA Survey data have been collected annually in a standardised format since 2001. 3 This dataset has several advantages for our purposes. First, it is a remarkably rich source of information on education and other relevant attributes, including demographics. Clearly, the richer the set of controls, the lower is the unobserved heterogeneity. Second, the data trace the same individuals over time, allowing us to measure job separations and where the worker went after separation.
We applied the following restrictions to the data to generate a sample of individuals who were: (i) present in two or more adjacent waves; (ii) in continuing employment (not in selfemployment or on a casual or fixed-term contract) at the first of each pair of waves; and (iii) receiving an hourly real wage w in the range of 1 < w < 100. 4 In addition, we dropped all pairs of waves in which the individual was younger than 25 years or older than 55 years in the second wave of the wave pair. 5 We also restricted the subsample to exclude workers who are in the armed forces, reporting over 100 working hours per week (hours are used to derive hourly wages), and full-time students. After applying these restrictions, we obtained an estimating sample comprising 14,887 person-1 Note that our Equation (3) is equivalent to equation (4.14) in Manning (2003) , while our Equation (4) is equivalent to Manning's equation (4.18) . 2 The data also distinguish between annual jobto-job transitions that are voluntary or involuntary.
3 Wave 1 included 13,969 respondents aged 15 and older distributed across 7682 households. Further details of the survey are provided in Watson (2008) and Wooden and Watson (2007) . 4 The hourly wage rate is that which is paid in the main job. To calculate this, we used the HILDAderived variables for the current weekly gross wages and salary for the main job, and for hours worked per week in the main job during the survey week (for more details, see Watson, 2008) . We deflated wages to 2001 (Wave 1) levels using the headline consumer price index (CPI) from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 5 For example, if a person was 55 years old in Wave 2, then the pair Wave 1 and Wave 2 would be included but not the subsequent ones (Wave 2 and Wave 3), and so on.
year observations, of which 8106 are men and 6781 are women. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the principal variables of interest. To calculate separations, we used our sample of pairs of waves containing individuals in continuous employment at time t, and then we checked where they were at time t + 1. The first row displays the mean yearly job separation rates for all forms of separation. 6 The first column shows this was 0.139 for the combined sample of men and women. That is, on average every year around 13.9 per cent of the sample of all workers in continuing jobs left that job for either another job or for non-employment. Next we disaggregate by gender. For men, the separation rate is 0.133, and for women it is slightly higher at 0.144. The second and third rows look at sepa-rations to employment and non-employment, respectively. We now see that the average separation rate each year to employment was 10.7 per cent. The male rate is slightly higher at 11.4 per cent than the female rate of 9.7 per cent. Separations to non-employment are much lower, being 3.2 per cent for men and women combined. When this is disaggregated by gender, each year just 1.9 per cent of men move into non-employment as compared with 4.7 per cent of women. The difference between the male and female mean separations is presented in the last column. In all cases, the difference between these two means is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level at least. Lastly, note that, conditional on job separation, around 0.77 of cases went to another job while the remainder went to non-employment. For women, the exit rate into another job is proportionately smaller (at 0.674) than for men, for whom it is 0.857.
It is interesting that these job separation rates from the HILDA Survey data are lower than those found in both the United States and the United Kingdom (see Manning, 2003) . While Table 1 also displays means of some other relevant variables. For our sample of all employees in continuing jobs, the hourly wage rate in 2001 values was $A21.23, while for men it was $A22.54 and for women $A19.65. These raw wage data indicate that Australian women in continuing jobs are earning around 87 per cent of the male wage on average. The women in our sample are a few months older than the men, but they have just over 2 years less labour market experience and their job tenure is shorter by over 1 year. Finally, note from the last panel of Table 1 that each pair of years represents around the same proportion of the sample, at between 16 per cent and 17 per cent.
IV Estimating the Wage Elasticity of
Separation The instantaneous job separation rate is given as s = e bX , where X i is a vector of individual and firm characteristics (including the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage, in 2001 prices, of individual i at time t), and the associated parameter vector is given by b. Since the natural logarithm of the wage rate is included as an explanatory variable, the elasticity of the separation rate with respect to the wage is simply the coefficient to the wage.
To obtain the wage elasticity of separation, we estimate logit models of the probability of separating from a continuing job. Thus, the dependent variable measures job terminations or separations from continuing employment in year t to either another job or to non-work in year t + 1.
Assume that the two types of separation conditional on X are independent. Given this, it is straightforward to show that separations to another job or to non-employment can be estimated separately, and that is what we do in this article. 7 To estimate the elasticity of separation to another job, we use our sample of individuals who have been in continuous employment at time t, and the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the person leaves to another job at time t + 1 and 0 otherwise. To estimate the elasticity of separation to non-employment, we use the sample of individuals who have been in continuous employment at time t, and the dependent variable is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the person leaves to non-employment at time t + 1 and 0 otherwise. For each subsample, we compute, from the estimated coefficient to the log wages, the wage elasticity calculated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables.
The combined elasticity is the weighted average of these two elasticities, with the weight given by the fraction of separations into nonemployment. 8 This is Method 2, described in Section II.
We estimate separation elasticities for three separate subsamples of data: men only, women only and the combined sample of men and women, all as shown in Table 2 . For each estimating sample we estimate three separate specifications: (i) without controls; (ii) with controls excluding job tenure; and (iii) with all controls including job tenure. First, consider the estimates of the separation elasticity calculated for any exit (either to another job or to non-employment), and presented in Panel A of Table 2 . For the combined sample of men and women (see the third column), and from the first specification with no controls, the elasticity is found to be )0.425. Once we incorporate controls (including the usual human capital measures but not job tenure), the elasticity drops to )0.361. A 1 per cent fall in the wage rate is associated with an increase in job separations of around one-third of 1 per cent, ceteris paribus. 9 Although there are good arguments for excluding tenure from the estimation, we present -in the last row of Panel A of Table 2 -the separation elasticity from a specification with tenure 7 See Manning (2003, p. 101 ) for a detailed exposition. This is analogous to estimation in a competing risks framework. 8 We also estimated all our models using probit regression, producing broadly similar elasticities to those reported here. Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) discuss in some detail methods of imputing the elasticity. We use the method they label as Method A. 9 Controls are gender, age, experience, experiencesquared, number of children, and dummies for health status, non-English-speaking background, marriage or cohabitation, highest educational qualification, state and urban. We also experimented with including wave, industry and part-time dummies, but our estimates are not significantly affected by their inclusion. We will discuss these estimates in the next section of the article.
included. 10 The elasticity almost halves, now becoming only )0.211. 11 Next consider the estimates of the separation elasticity for the separate male and female subsamples, calculated for any exit, and presented in the first two columns of Panel A. The second row of estimates, our preferred specification, shows the wage elasticity of job separation to be )0.389 for men and )0.31 for women. Now turn to the disaggregated separation elasticities to another job and to non-employment respectively, shown in Panels B and C of Table 2 . These reveal that women are more sensitive to wages when shifting to another job than are men, but that men are more sensitive when shifting to non-employment. The finding that the female wage elasticity of separation is not significantly different from 0 is striking, suggesting as it does that Australian women are making decisions to leave a continuing job entirely on non-wage considerations. However, Australian men are not.
That there is not a larger increase in separations in response to lower wages suggests that other factors are keeping workers at the firm, factors that we have not been able to control for in spite of our excellent data. Of course, this is in accord with the assumptions of much of the 'new monopsony' theory -that there are labour market frictions, search costs and non-pecuniary factors keeping workers in a job and consequently allowing the employer to extract some rents. For example, as noted in Section I, Bhaskar and To (1999) assume workers have idiosyncratic preferences over employment at different firms, and those preferences are private information. Notes: Asterisks denote levels of significance: *10 per cent, **5 per cent and ***1 per cent. Standard errors are given within parentheses. The rows headed 'no controls' include only the wage reported in the previous wave and a female dummy for the pooled regressions. The rows marked 'with controls' include health, urban, education, marital status, children, region, experience, experience-squared, age bands, non-English-speaking background and a female dummy for the pooled regressions. The rows headed 'tenure controls' include tenure and tenure-squared. 10 As job tenure and wages are positively correlated with one another and negatively correlated with job separations, the inclusion of job tenure will reduce the wage elasticity. In that case, why include it at all? As noted by Manning (2003) , one might want to capture the possibility that higher wages affect separations both directly and indirectly through job tenure. But on the other hand, if there are seniority wage scales whereby workers advance automatically up the wage scale as the job-years roll by, an apparent relationship between separations and wages may be spurious. The inclusion of tenure captures this seniority-scale effect and hence spurious correlation of wages and employment will be removed. 11 Tenure and tenure-squared are significant in all regressions (negative and positive, respectively). As expected, the inclusion of job tenure always considerably reduces the estimated wage elasticity.
Thus, a firm's wage offer depends on how much he ⁄ she believes the employee prefers working there rather than elsewhere. Bhaskar and To (1999) cite various empirical studies supporting the assumption that workers have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics. Bhaskar et al. (2002) further note that this assumption can usefully summarise the variety of reasons for imperfect competition in the labour market. Specifically, equilibrium implies that a firm offers a wage below marginal product, where the firm's trade-off is between offering an even lower wage and an increased probability that the worker chooses to work elsewhere.
Using these elasticities of separation with respect to the wage rate, we can now impute the wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm using Methods 1 and 2. The results of this exercise are presented in the following section.
V Estimating the Wage Elasticity of
Labour Supply to the Firm To obtain the wage elasticity of the labour supply the firm faces, we use Equations (3) and (6) (Methods 1 and 2, respectively). Method 1 states that the negative of the elasticity of the labour supply is given by twice the elasticity of the steady-state separation rate with respect to the wage. These results are given in Panel B of Table 3 .
Our preferred estimates are those calculated with Method 2 and given in Panel F at the bottom of the table. These utilise the disaggregated separation elasticities to another job or to nonemployment, which are then weighted by their shares to construct the wage elasticity of the labour supply. For the specification which includes all the controls except job tenure, the wage elasticity of labour supply is 0.709 for the combined sample, and is 0.76 for men and 0.61 for women. 12
Our estimates from Australian data are only slightly smaller than those reported for the United Kingdom by Manning (2003, table 4.10) . Manning finds an elasticity of labour supply of 0.75 using both the BHPS and the UK Labour Force Surveys (LFS), while ours is 0.71. In contrast, his reported elasticity of labour supply for the US is 1.38 using the PSID data and 0.68 using the NLSY data. Table 4 reports this comparison.
In the previous section, we chose to present results from a specification similar to that of Manning (2003) to facilitate comparisons. In addition, we also re-estimated our models including time and industry dummy variables. The wage elasticities from those regressions are reported in Table 3 (see the last row of each panel). A comparison of those elasticities from Panel F of Table 3 shows that the inclusion of time and industry dummies leads to a small increase, from 0.76 to 0.84 for men, and from 0.61 to 0.65 for women.
VI Sensitivity Analysis: Fixed Effects
Logit Estimates So far we have utilised the panel structure of the data only to identify transitions, to compare our estimates with those obtained by Manning (2003) using a similar methodology. However, to cater for unobserved heterogeneity that may lead to biased coefficients (if some individuals are innately more likely to change jobs) we also estimated a fixed-effects logit model. This allows for correlation between the individual effect and the regressors.
Estimation of the fixed effects or conditional logit model requires that individuals are present in at least two sets of wave pairs, which necessarily reduces the sample size. Almost half the sample is present in only one or two pairs of waves. Obviously those individuals present in only one pair (approximately one-quarter of the sample) will be dropped from the conditional logit subsample. 13 Thus, our estimating subsample comprises 3624 individuals (1925 men and 1699 women) who are present in the data for between two and six pairs of waves.
12 Such gender differences are consistent with other studies, although the magnitude differs. For example, Ransom and Oaxaca (2005), using US data from a chain of grocery stores, estimate elasticities of labour supply to the firm of around 2.7 for men and 1.5 for women. Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009) investigate the evidence for monopsonistic discrimination by gender, using linked employer-employee data for Norway. Their results suggest that a proportion of the gender gap might be attributable to gender differences in labour market frictions. They find elasticities between 0.8 and 1.7 for different groups. 13 There is considerable job stability across waves for the HILDA data. Australian workers in continuing employment do, like their British counterparts, leave their jobs relatively infrequently compared with those in a country like the United States (see Booth et al., 1999) .
The results from this conditional logit model are presented in Table 5 . After controlling for fixed effects, and time and industry dummies, we find (see last row of Panel A) that the wage elasticity of all separations is )0.63 for men and )0.60 for women. This is precisely determined only for men. For women we find that separation rates are no longer sensitive to the wage rate. Whether this is an artefact of our particular dataset remains to be seen, as so far there has been little research in the separations literature relying on fixed effects estimation. Our fixed effects findings that female separations are not significantly increased in response to lower wages do suggest that other factors may be keeping women at the firm. This accords with the assumptions of much of the 'new monopsony' theory, namely that labour market frictions, search costs and non-pecuniary factors contribute to worker retention and consequently allow the employer to extract some rents.
VII A Cross-country Comparison of Separation
Elasticities by Gender We now briefly compare our separation elasticities -obtained using the pooled crosssectional HILDA Survey data discussed in Section V -with those found by Manning (2003, table 7 .7) for the United Kingdom and the United States, focusing on the gender differences. This is a particularly relevant comparison, as Manning also uses representative survey-based panel data. These elasticities are summarised in Table 6 , with standard errors given in parentheses. Notice that including controls in the HILDA data reduces the estimated wage elasticity in almost all cases, but by a smaller extent than BHPS.
For the sample of men and women pooled, the elasticities for both separations to employment and non-employment are sensitive to the wage. However, contrary to the BHPS estimates, we find with HILDA that the latter is smaller than the former. Moreover, even though our estimates from the samples with men and women pooled are remarkably similar, as Table 4 indicated, there are some striking gender differences when we disaggregate by gender.
First, comparing the BHPS and HILDA estimates, we see that the British female separation elasticities to other jobs are smaller than that of the males in absolute terms. While we expected the absolute value of the male elasticity to be greater than the female for separations to other jobs, this was not found with the HILDA data. However, the difference is not large. 14 Hirsch et al. (2010) employ a dynamic monopsony framework to investigate women's and men's labour supply to the firm. Using German-linked employer-employee data, they find not only that labour supply elasticities are small (1.9-3.7), but also that women's labour supply to the firm is less elastic than that of men.
Second, according to the BHPS, male and female separation elasticities to non-employment are not so very different, although they are smaller in absolute terms for women than for men. However, the HILDA estimates find a big difference. Indeed, the HILDA data suggest that, while the male elasticities of separation to non-employment are not so different to those from the BHPS, the HILDA female wage elasticities of separation to non-employment are close to 0. Indeed, as noted in Section IV, Australian women appear to make decisions to leave a continuing job entirely on non-wage considerations, whereas men do not. We hope to explore these gender comparisons further in our future research.
VIII Conclusions
Are labour markets competitive or are they characterised by frictions that essentially render them imperfectly competitive? We addressed this question through estimation of the elasticity of labour supply to a firm, using the HILDA Survey, a panel survey with rich information about worker turnover as well as individual-and firm-level attributes.
The essence of monopsonistically competitive or oligopsonistic labour markets is that labour supply to a firm is imperfectly elastic with respect to the wage rate. The intuition is that where workers have heterogeneous preferences or face mobility costs, firms can offer lower wages without immediately losing their workforce. This is in contrast to the perfectly competitive extreme, in which the elasticity is infinite. Therefore, a simple test of whether labour markets are perfectly or imperfectly competitive involves estimating the wage elasticity of the labour supply to a firm. We found that the Australian wage elasticity of labour supply is around 0.71, only slightly smaller than the figure of 0.75 reported by Manning (2003) for the United Kingdom.
While in an ideal world one would prefer to estimate the wage elasticity of the labour supply to a firm using data from a natural experiment in which there is an exogenous change in an individual firm's wages, such data are extremely rare. Our estimates for Australia, in common with those from earlier research using the same modelling strategy, may well be downward-biased for the reasons detailed by Manning (2003) .
In summary, these estimates of the wage elasticity of labour supply to a firm are so far from the perfectly competitive prediction of an No controls infinite elasticity that it would be difficult to make a case that labour markets are perfectly competitive. This has implications for policy based on a simplistic modelling of the labour market as perfectly competitive, for models based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets are likely to produce misleading predictions. It is interesting that a parallel stream of the labour economics literature, focusing on employer-provided training and the conditions under which firms will finance it, has reached a similar conclusion. 15
